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THE LAW OF ATTORNEY FEES
IN FAMILY LAW CASES
ROBERT G. SPECTOR * & CAROLYN S. THOMPSON **
The American Rule states that, unless specifically allowed, attorney fees
are not recoverable. 1 It is, therefore, necessary for an attorney seeking fees
in a family law case to identify specifically the basis for the award of fees.2
In Oklahoma, there are seventeen separate statutes that authorize a court to
award attorney fees in particular circumstances.3 Failure to identify the
specific basis for the award may result in the attorney fee award being
reversed. 4
Part I of this article surveys each possible basis for a fee award and
details the information necessary for a court to make an award. It also
discusses the information a court needs to calculate an appropriate award.
Part II of this article discusses the procedure in obtaining attorney fees in
certain family law situations. Part III analyzes a lawyer’s interest in
attorney fees, particularly when payable directly to the attorney. Finally,

* Glen R. Watson Chair and Centennial Professor of Law Emeritus, University of
Oklahoma College of Law.
** Thompson Law Office, Edmond, Oklahoma.
1. Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 OK 55, ¶ 46, 11 P.3d 162, 178-79.
2. Id. This article is concerned only with the recovery of attorney fees from the other
party in a family law case. It does not cover entitlement to costs, appellate attorney fees, or
other expenses. Whether and under what circumstances costs and expenses can be recovered
depends on the wording of the statute. For example, the prevailing party in an enforcement
proceeding under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act can recover
“necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs,
communication expenses, attorney’s fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel
expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings.” 43 OKLA. STAT. § 551-312
(2011).
3. The following statutes and their pertinent, accompanying subsections are discussed
in Part I of this article: 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-636(c) (2011); 22 OKLA. STAT. § 60.2(c)(1)
(Supp. 2013); 43 OKLA. STAT. §§ 107.3(A)(3), (D) (2011); 43 OKLA. STAT. §§ 109.2,
109.4(f)(6), 109.4(I) (Supp. 2016); 43 OKLA. STAT. §§ 110(d)–(e) (2011); 43 OKLA. STAT. §
111.1(C)(3) (2011); 43 OKLA. STAT. § 111.2 (2011); 43 OKLA. STAT. § 111.3(E) (Supp.
2014); 43 OKLA. STAT. §§ 112(D), 112.3(F)(1), 112.6 (2011); 43 OKLA. STAT. §§ 150.10,
551-208(C), 551-312.
4. This is because, according to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, all attorney fee
award statutes must be strictly construed. See Gruenwald v. Gruenwald, 2014 OK CIV APP
43, ¶ 8, 324 P.3d 1267, 1269 (citing Eagle Bluff, L.L.C. v. Taylor, 2010 OK 47, ¶ 16, 237
P.3d 173).
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Part IV of this article considers longstanding ethical considerations in
obtaining contingency fees in family law cases.
I. Basis for an Attorney Fee Award
This Part I of the article illustrates the interplay of a court’s common-law
authority to award attorney fees with Oklahoma statutory authority in
certain types of family law cases. This statutory authority is categorized
into two distinct groups: statutes utilizing the balancing-of-equities standard
and statutes pertaining to which party prevails in the case.
A. The Inherent Power of the Court
A court has inherent, common-law authority to award fees where one
party’s conduct during the case has been oppressive, abusive, or has
otherwise unduly prolonged and exacerbated the litigation.5 For example, in
Briggeman v. Hargrove, 6 the mother, an Ohio resident, incurred attorney
fees, costs, and expenses while defending against an emergency custody
application and a modification of custody application filed by the father in
Tulsa County. 7 The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted the mother a writ of
prohibition because the trial court did not have jurisdiction under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to entertain the
proceeding. 8
The mother then filed an application in the Tulsa County proceeding
requesting attorney fees, costs, and expenses. 9 The case was submitted
without appellate briefs, and the appellate panel reversed the trial court’s
determination that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding or
award fees. 10 The panel summarily held that notwithstanding the entry of
the writ of prohibition, the trial court had the inherent equitable power to
award the mother attorney fees in the event it found the father’s conduct
was oppressive or abusive. 11

5. Winters ex rel Winters v. City of Okla. City, 1987 OK 63, ¶ 12, 740 P.2d 724, 727.
6. 2014 OK CIV APP 13, 318 P.3d 1130.
7. Id. ¶ 2, 318 P.3d at 1131.
8. Id.
9. Id. ¶ 3, 318 P.3d at 1131. She sought fees pursuant to title 10, section 7700-636 of
the Oklahoma Statutes, which permits the trial court to assess fees and costs in a proceeding
to adjudicate parentage. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-636(C) (2011).
10. Briggeman, ¶¶ 5-6, 318 P.3d at 1131-32.
11. Id. ¶ 6, 318 P.3d at 1132 (citing Winters ex rel Winters v. City of Okla. City, 1987
OK 63, ¶¶ 6-10, 740 P.2d 724, 725-26).
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It has long been the position of Oklahoma courts that attorney fees may
be awarded when one party takes unreasonable positions at trial and
unreasonably prolongs the litigation. 12 However, the failure to make
reasonable settlement offers is not the same as vexatious litigation. 13
B. Statutes: The Balancing of Equities
This section of the article discusses four types of family law cases where
courts rely upon the balancing-of-equities standard in awarding attorney
fees.
1. The Divorce Statute Section 110
The major Oklahoma statutory provisions authorizing fees in divorce
cases are title 43, subsections 110(D) 14 and 110(E). 15 The decision to award

12. Casey v. Casey, 1993 OK CIV APP 129, ¶ 8, 860 P.2d 807, 810 (“The court
specifically found Appellant (a) delayed and thwarted the division of personal property when
she refused to participate in the silent auction, (b) unreasonably refused to list the residence
for sale, (c) demanded excessive support alimony, child support and cash settlement, (d)
cited Appellee for contempt on three different occasions, (e) required Appellant to incur
expense of $1,000.00 to pay a bondsman, (f) unreasonably withheld records from Appellee,
and (g) required Appellee to file a 1990 separate income tax return. There is no abuse of
discretion in requiring Appellant to pay the attorney fees she actively participated in
creating.”); Wood v. Wood, 1990 OK CIV APP 49, ¶ 18, 793 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (“[T]he
record shows that the Appellant exacerbated the litigation and that his conduct throughout
the trial served to increase the resulting fees. Appellee was required to initiate seven
contempt proceedings against Appellant in order to enforce court orders. The extensive
record in this case shows that nearly every journal entry of the trial court’s orders required
Appellee to file a motion to settle. Appellee was forced to complete substantial discovery in
order to uncover the secret bank account which Appellant concealed and to ascertain
Appellant’s actual commission income.”); Morey v. Morey, ¶ 14, 1981 OK CIV APP 46,
632 P.2d 773, 775 (“In this instance, Husband secretly obtained a divorce and actively
deceived Wife for almost two years before she learned, through her attorney, that she was
already divorced. This is a prime example of one party to a divorce deliberately delaying and
frustrating the other party with almost mindless disregard for the other’s rights. . . . Under
these circumstances we find she was entitled to be reimbursed for her costs of litigation.
These included her attorney fees . . . .”).
See also Gardner v. Gardner, 1981 OK CIV APP 9, 629 P.2d 1283, where the court
describes potential liability for attorney fees when a party acts “arbitrarily, capriciously, or
where [it] has unduly protracted or ‘churned’ the litigation.” Id. ¶ 27, 629 P.2d at 1287.
13. See Shirley v. Shirley, 2004 OK CIV APP 100, ¶ 7, 104 P.3d 1142, 1144 (“Because
it appears the trial court used the award in this case as a penalty for failing to settle, we will
modify the award by reducing it to $10,000.”).
14. This subsection reads: “Upon granting a decree of dissolution of marriage,
annulment of a marriage, or legal separation, the court may require either party to pay such
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fees under these subsections depends on a judicial balancing of the
equities. 16 In addition to the trial court’s inherent authority to award fees
based on vexatious litigation, the court may also take into account the
parties’ conduct during the litigation that may not, in and of itself, justify
fees under the court’s inherent power. 17 Although the court cannot use
attorney fees as a penalty for failure to settle an issue, no case prohibits its
use when one party continues to reject reasonable settlement offers and
ultimately ends up worse off than the settlement proposals.18 In balancing
the equities the court may also consider the relative financial positions of

reasonable expenses of the other as may be just and proper under the circumstances.” 43
OKLA. STAT. § 110(D) (2011).
15. This subsection reads:
The court may in its discretion make additional orders relative to the expenses
of any such subsequent actions, including but not limited to writs of habeas
corpus, brought by the parties or their attorneys, for the enforcement or
modification of any interlocutory or final orders in the dissolution of marriage
action made for the benefit of either party or their respective attorneys.
Id. § 110(E).
16. Kerby v. Kerby, 2007 OK 36, ¶ 7, 164 P.3d 1053, 1055; Thielenhaus v.
Thielenhaus, 1995 OK 5, ¶ 19, 890 P.2d 925, 935. Formerly, the statute simply required the
trial court to consider the means and property of the respective parties. See Walker v.
Walker, 1976 OK 169, 559 P.2d 1233 (examining the requirements to award attorney fees
under 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1276 (amended 1976), which was renumbered as 43 OKLA. STAT. §
110 in 1989). Cases decided prior to the amendment that ordered attorney fee awards simply
on the basis of economic disparity should no longer be considered good law.
Although the attorney fee provisions in subsections 110(D) and 110(E) seem to refer only
to an award of attorney fees covering the merits hearing and post-decree issues, at least one
appellate panel has held that attorney fees can also be awarded in a case to enforce
temporary orders under section 110(B). Buckingham v. Buckingham, 2012 OK CIV APP 34,
¶ 6, 274 P.3d 855, 856 (“Holding that attorney fees are allowed at every stage of a divorce,
except the enforcement of a temporary order, would create an absurd result. As a result, we
read ‘subsequent actions’ in § 110(E) as referring to actions subsequent to the filing of the
petition for dissolution of marriage, including actions to enforce temporary orders.”).
17. See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2006 OK CIV APP 112, ¶ 35, 144 P.3d 173, 186 (noting that
“Wife failed to comply with the trial court’s order to attach time sheets, affidavits, and
copies of settlement offers to her application” when affirming the trial court’s decision to
strike the Wife’s attorney fee application).
18. In Finger v. Finger, discussed infra note 36, one of the factors is “whether either
party unnecessarily complicated or delayed the proceedings.” 1996 OK CIV APP 91, ¶ 14,
923 P.2d 1195, 1198. That appears to be a lesser burden to justify fees than the burden under
the court’s inherent power to order attorney fees. For a case that seems to qualify as an
example, see Mullendore v. Mullendore, 2012 OK CIV APP 100, ¶ 15, 288 P.3d 948, 955.
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the parties. 19 Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court summarily affirmed
two attorney fee awards. In doing so, it may have elevated the means and
property of the parties to a primary position in balancing the equities under
title 43, subsections 110(D)–(E) of the Oklahoma Statutes.
First, in Childers v. Childers, 20 the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected
the husband’s appeal concerning the valuation of marital property. 21 It also
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the husband’s request for attorney fees. 22
The court noted that fees are awarded based on a balancing of the
equities. 23 In this case, both parties received substantial property awards. 24
They each were allowed to use $40,000 from a savings account to pay their
attorneys. 25 The husband had a life insurance license, a long-term health
care license, and a securities license.26 The husband admitted to being
employable, but voluntarily chose not to pursue gainful employment and
instead does charity work. 27 The fact that the wife made much more money
than the husband was not determinative, especially when he testified that he
has high-level managerial and entrepreneurial skills.28 Therefore, the trial
court’s decision not to allow fees was affirmed. 29
However, in Boatman v. Boatman, 30 the trial court summarily denied
attorney fees without holding a hearing. 31 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court.32 It noted that, “[i]n matrimonial litigation, a party
should be awarded attorney fees only if they qualify for the benefit through
a judicial balancing of the equities considering the means and property of
each party.” 33 In this case, the mother earned $115,000 plus bonuses, which
19. Abbott v. Abbott, 2001 OK 31, ¶ 12, 25 P.3d 291, 294. If the court awards a
sufficient amount of income-producing property to both spouses, it is not uncommon to
require each party to bear their own fees. See, e.g., Casey v. Casey, 1993 OK CIV APP 129,
¶ 16, 860 P.2d 807, 809; Gardner v. Gardner, 1981 OK CIV APP 9, ¶ 31, 629 P.2d 1283,
1299.
20. 2016 OK 95, 382 P.3d 1020.
21. Id. ¶ 18, 382 P.3d at 1024.
22. Id. ¶ 32, 382 P.3d at 1027–28.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. ¶ 30, 382 P.3d at 1027.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. ¶ 32, 382 P.3d at 1027–28.
30. 2017 OK 27.
31. Id. ¶ 15.
32. Id. ¶ 20.
33. Id. ¶ 17.
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was twice what the father earned. 34 Given this disparity in income, the court
found that the mother could not qualify for an attorney fee award when the
equities were balanced. 35 There are very few cases where the litigant with
greater financial means seeks attorney fees. Boatman suggests that under
those circumstances it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for that party
to prevail under a balancing of the equities.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has attempted to indicate factors
the trial court should consider when deciding whether an attorney fee is
appropriate in post-decretal cases under subsection 110(E). In Finger v.
Finger, 36 the panel said the trial court should consider
the outcome of the action for modification; whether the
subsequent action was brought because one of the parties had
endangered or compromised the health, safety, or welfare of the
child or children; whether one party’s behavior demonstrated the
most interest in the child or children’s physical, material, moral,
and spiritual welfare; whether one party’s behavior demonstrated
a priority of self-interest over the best interests of the child or
children; whether either party unnecessarily complicated or
delayed the proceedings, or made the subsequent litigation more
vexatious than it needed to be; and finally, the means and
property of the respective parties. 37
Some of the considerations mentioned in Finger are common in attorney
fee hearings under section 110, i.e., the means and property of the
individuals and whether either party unnecessarily complicated or delayed
the proceedings. Other mentioned factors are particularly appropriate when
considering post-decree motions concerning children and seem to be
primarily used in those cases. 38 However, the Finger factors have been used
in cases arising under subsection 110(D) that are not post-decretal cases.
For example, in Husband v. Husband, the panel cited Finger as justification
for an attorney fee award in an appeal from a separate maintenance action.39
The court seemed to broaden the Finger standard by declaring that “[i]n
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 1996 OK CIV APP 91, 923 P.2d 1195.
37. Id. ¶ 14, 923 P.2d at 1198.
38. See, e.g., Chacon v. Chacon, 2012 OK CIV APP 27, ¶ 60, 275 P.3d 943, 958;
Guyton v. Guyton, 2011 OK CIV APP 92, ¶ 17, 262 P.3d 1145, 1152; Guymer v. Guymer,
2011 OK CIV APP 4, ¶ 9, 245 P.3d 638, 640-41.
39. 2010 OK CIV APP 42, ¶¶ 35-36, 233 P.3d 383, 389-90.
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considering what is just and proper under the circumstances, the court in the
exercise of its discretion should consider the totality of circumstances
leading up to, and including, the subsequent action for which expenses and
fees are being sought.” 40
The result appears to be that, in considering whether an attorney fee
award is appropriate under section 110, there are no bounds to the court’s
discretion in the scope of information it can consider. The court’s
determination of the fee amount is reviewable only for an abuse of
discretion. 41 However, the issue of whether a litigant is entitled to an
attorney fee is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. 42
There are several cases where the attorney fee provisions of section 110
are inapplicable. There is no authority, for example, to award attorney fees
under section 110 either to or from third parties since the statute supposes
that there are only two parties to a divorce.43 Therefore, when grandparents
intervene in a divorce proceeding to seek custody and are ultimately
dismissed, there is no authority to award fees against the grandparents.44
The provisions of subsections 110(D) and 110(E) also only apply in divorce
cases. 45 The parties, therefore, must find other authority if attorney fees are
to be awarded in non-divorce situations.
2. Parentage Proceedings
Parentage proceedings are governed by the Uniform Parentage Act.46 In
McKiddy v. Alarkon, the court required a different basis to award attorney
fees because the court found that title 43, section 110 was inapplicable to
parentage cases. 47 Instead, authority to award fees in a parentage case is
provided by title 43, section 109.2 and title 10, section 7700-636. 48 Since

40. Id. ¶ 35, 233 P.3d at 389-90.
41. State ex rel. Burk v. City of Okla. City, 1979 OK 115, ¶ 22, 598 P.2d 659, 663.
42. Finnell v. Seismic, 2003 OK 35, ¶ 7, 67 P.3d 339, 342.
43. Rogers v. Rogers, 1999 OK CIV APP 123, ¶ 10, 994 P.2d 102, 105 (“It is apparent
§§ 110(C) and (D) contemplate but two parties, the divorcing husband and wife, and do not
provide for an award of attorney fees and costs for an intervening party.”).
44. Fulsom v. Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, ¶ 16, 81 P.3d 652, 658-59.
45. Id. ¶ 12, 81 P.3d at 657.
46. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-101 to -902 (2011).
47. 2011 OK CIV APP 63, ¶¶ 15, 22-25, 254 P.3d 141, 146, 147-48.
48. Title 43, section 109.2(B) provides that “[i]f the parties to the action are the parents
of the children, the court may determine which party should have custody of said children,
may award child support to the parent to whom it awards custody, and may make an
appropriate order for payment of costs and attorney fees.” 43 OKLA. STAT. § 109.2(B) (Supp.
2016).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

670

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:663

there is no mention of a prevailing party, the attorney fee award under these
sections should also be governed by the balancing-of-equities standard.
3. Grandparent Visitation
The grandparent visitation statute, title 43, section 109.4(I), provides that
“in any action for grandparental visitation pursuant to this section, the court
may award attorney fees and costs, as the court deems equitable.”49
Although there is no case law detailing the factors the court should take into
account in determining eligibility for fees under this section, it is likely that
the same considerations in the balancing-of-equities standard that courts use
under section 110 are applicable here as well. There is at least one case
where the trial court’s assessment of attorney fees against the grandparents
was affirmed. 50
4. The Guardian ad Litem Statute
Another statute that appears to qualify for balancing of equities is title
43, section 107.3, which allows a court to appoint an attorney as a guardian
ad litem for children.51 Subsection 107.3(A)(3) provides that “[e]xpenses,
costs, and attorney fees for the guardian ad litem may be allocated between
the parties as determined by the court.” 52 In this statute, the term “attorney
fees” is not used in the same sense as in section 110. Since the statute
provides in subsection 107.3(A)(1) that an attorney may be appointed as
guardian ad litem, the fee described in that provision is not for representing
a party, but rather reflects the cost of using guardian ad litem services. By
common tradition, this language is not treated as a representation cost
subject to a balancing-of-equities standard. Instead, the court divides the

Title 10, section 7700-636 is part of the Oklahoma enactment of the Uniform Parentage
Act. It provides that a court “may assess filing fees, reasonable attorney fees, fees for genetic
testing, other costs, and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred in a
proceeding under this Article.” 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-636(c) (2011). The provision in this
statute allows for a broader recovery than the comparable provision in Title 43 and should,
therefore, be used as the basis of recovery.
49. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 109.4(I) (Supp. 2016).
50. Vance v. Loy, 2007 OK CIV APP 34, ¶ 12, 158 P.3d 503, 506. Because the court
had no transcript of attorney fee proceedings, however, it was impossible for the appellate
panel to determine how the trial court decided the merits of the mother’s request for fees. Id.
When this happens, the appellate panel may, and did in this case, presume the trial court was
correct. Id.
51. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 107.3 (2011).
52. Id. § 107.3(A)(3).
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cost of the guardian ad litem fee in the same proportion as child support
amounts allocated to each party. 53
C. Statutes: Prevailing Party
While the previously discussed family law statutes award attorney fees
using the balancing-of-equities standard, there are several family law
statutes that award attorney fees based on which party prevails.54
1. False Allegations of Child Abuse
Title 43, section 107.3 provides that if a party intentionally makes
a false or frivolous accusation to the court of child abuse or
neglect against the other party, the court shall proceed with any
or all of [the listed sanctions, including] . . . [a]ward[ing] the
obligation to pay all court costs and legal expenses encumbered
by both parties arising from the allegations of the accusing
party. 55
Although the section does not refer to a “prevailing party,” the term is
implied by the language that requires a false report as a threshold matter
before considering any remedy. 56 The term “legal expenses” conceivably
includes attorney fees, though currently there are too few cases applying the
statute to know for certain. The elements that must be proved to obtain
these legal expenses under this section are

53. For the statutes governing the calculation of child support, see id. § 118D.
54. The standard definition of prevailing party is one in whose favor judgment is
rendered. See Assocs. Fin. Serv. v. Millsap, 1977 OK 157, ¶ 8, 570 P.2d 323, 326. The
definition of a prevailing party is not confined to one who obtains judgment after a trial on
the merits. Prof’l Credit Collections, Inc. v. Smith, 1997 OK 19, ¶ 12, 933 P.2d 307, 311.
Nor is it necessary that a party obtain all of the relief requested in order to be the prevailing
party. McKiddy v. Alarkon, 2011 OK CIV APP 63, ¶ 22, 254 P.3d 141, 147. In McKiddy,
the parties settled the father’s modification of custody motion by providing that the mother
would retain custody and the father would have increased visitation. Id. ¶ 5, 254 P.3d at 143.
The court found that the mother was the prevailing party because the father filed a motion to
modify custody and, in the end, the mother retained custody. Id. ¶ 22, 254 P.3d at 147. In
many family law cases with multiple issues, the determination of prevailing party can be
very murky. Most prevailing-party statutes, however, refer to a particular issue, thereby
alleviating some of the murkiness.
55. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 107.3(D).
56. Id.
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context of a child-custody proceeding;
an allegation concerning child abuse or neglect;
intent to make the allegation; and
falsity or frivolousness of the allegation.57

The terms of the statute seem to authorize an award only for the amount
of legal expenses arising from defense against the false allegations. In a
custody trial, for example, the fees incurred in rebutting false allegations of
child abuse or neglect would be recoverable under this section, but fees
covering the entire case would not. Attorneys planning to seek fees under
this section should keep clear records indicating what part of the fees
incurred were used to rebut the false allegations.58 The trial court’s
assessment of fees or other remedies under this section should also include
specific findings as to each of the four requirements. 59
2. Relocation Cases
In relocation cases, title 43, section 112.3 of the Oklahoma Statutes
requires that the relocating parent send notice of the proposed relocation to
the other parent.60 The court may consider the failure to give notice to be
“sufficient cause to order the person seeking to relocate the child to pay

57. Id.
58. See Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70, ¶¶ 22-23, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051-52 (authorizing
the trial court to apportion the legal fees between those areas where fees can be recovered
and those where it cannot be recovered).
59. See In re Marriage of Slate, 2010 OK CIV APP 38, ¶ 14, 232 P.3d 916, 919. In
Slate, the court noted:
[T]he trial court not only made the required § 107.3(D) determination but also
listed five reasons in its final decree supporting that determination. As
summarized, the trial court found that: (1) Mother made her first allegation of
physical abuse almost immediately after the court placed primary custody with
Father because the child was eligible for pre-kindergarten enrollment; (2)
Mother failed to meet the burden of proof in her first application for emergency
custody and her second application had strikingly similar allegations; (3) DHS
investigated Mother’s second application and could not confirm any of her
allegations; (4) Mother asked her stepmother to write a letter about previous
alleged abuse by Father that was primarily based on Mother’s assertions, i.e.,
the stepmother had no personal knowledge about the assertions; and (5)
testimony indicated that Mother had made frivolous allegations of improper
child restraint in Father’s vehicle at one of the visitation exchanges.
Id.
60. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 112.3(F)(1) (2011).
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reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred by the person objecting to
the relocation.” 61
This relocation statute does not use the term “prevailing party.” It is only
triggered, however, when one party commits a fault—the failure to give
notice—against the other party. Therefore, this statute is more properly
classified with the prevailing-party category.
In addition to the provision on failure to give notice, the relocation
statute also provides that the court may
impose a sanction on a person proposing a relocation of the child
or objecting to a proposed relocation of a child if it determines
that the proposal was made or the objection was filed:
a. to harass a person or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation,
b. without being warranted by existing law or was based on
frivolous argument, or
c. based on allegations and other factual contentions which
had no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
could not have been reasonably believed to be likely to
have evidentiary support after further investigation. 62
This sanction is “limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct” and may include “some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.” 63
This part of the relocation statute clearly is a prevailing-party statute. It
requires proof of the listed factors and is similar in many ways to the statute
on false allegations of child abuse. Again, it will be necessary to distinguish
between those fees expended on the relocation issue as opposed to any
other issue pertaining to the children.
3. Visitation and Child Support Enforcement
Visitation and child support enforcement involve several statutes.
a) Section 111.1
Title 43, section 111.1(B) provides:

61. Id.
62. Id. § 112.3(L)(1).
63. Id. § 112.3(L)(2).
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1. Except for good cause shown, when a noncustodial parent
who is ordered to pay child support and who is awarded
visitation rights fails to pay child support, the custodial parent
shall not refuse to honor the visitation rights of the noncustodial
parent.
2. When a custodial parent refuses to honor the visitation
rights of the noncustodial parent, the noncustodial parent shall
not fail to pay any ordered child support or alimony. 64
These provisions require that visitation can be withheld from a noncustodial
parent for good cause unrelated to the noncustodial parent’s failure to pay
support. However, there is no good-cause option for the obligor when
visitation is withheld. Child support must continue to be paid.
Interestingly, the attorney fee provision of this statute in subsection
(C)(3) provides that “[u]nless good cause is shown for the noncompliance,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover court costs and attorney fees
expended in enforcing the order and any other reasonable costs and
expenses incurred in connection with the denied child support or denied
visitation as authorized by the court.” 65
This “prevailing party” language means that fees can be assessed against
the person who initiates the proceeding or the person against whom the
proceeding was commenced. However, this means there is some
contradiction in the statute. A custodial parent can defend a proceeding to
enforce visitation by showing that there was good cause for not allowing
the visitation. A child support obligor, on the other hand, must continue to
pay child support even if visitation is withheld without good cause. At the
attorney fee hearing, however, the noncustodial parent may defend the
award of fees on the basis that there was good cause for failure to pay the
child support, which was not supposed to be withheld in the first place.
b) Section 111.3(E)
Title 43, section 111.3 is also concerned with enforcement of visitation.
Subsection E provides that “[t]he prevailing party shall be granted
reasonable attorney fees, mediation costs, and court costs.” 66

64. Id. § 111.1(B).
65. Id. § 111.1(c)(3).
66. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 111.3(E) (Supp. 2014). The award of attorney fees under these
statutes is mandatory. For a recent example, see Morie v. Morie (In re Marriage of Morie),
No. 113,710 (Okla. Civ. App. Oct. 15, 2015).
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Section 111.3(E) requires the payment of fees to the party who initiates
the visitation enforcement action only if the criteria of subsection D are
met. 67 Subsection D requires that the custodial parent has unreasonably
denied, or otherwise interfered with, the noncustodial parent’s visitation
rights. 68 If the movant does not sustain the burden of showing that the
visitation has been unreasonably denied or otherwise interfered with,
attorney fees are not due to the movant. 69
c) Section 112(D)
Title 43, section 112(D) also pertains to visitation denial. It provides that
“a pattern of failure to allow court-ordered visitation may be determined to
be contrary to the best interests of the child” and may be the basis of a
change of custody. 70 If a proceeding is brought under this provision, “the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover court costs, attorney fees, and
any other reasonable costs and expenses incurred with the action.”71
To trigger the attorney fee provision of section 112(D) for the petitioner,
it must be shown that there is a pattern of visitation denial that is contrary to
the best interests of the child.72 This contrasts with section 111.3(E), which
requires that the visitation be unreasonably denied or otherwise interfered
with. 73 Section 112(D) was invoked in King v. King, where the court found
that the mother had good cause to deny visitation when there was evidence
that the child had been abused while visiting the father in accordance with a
visitation order. 74 In those circumstances, not only was the mother entitled
to attorney fees for the trial, but she was also entitled to appellate attorney
fees. 75 The court held that, at least under this statute, an award of attorney
fees to the prevailing party includes an award of appellate attorney fees.76

67. See 43 OKLA. STAT. § 111.3(D).
68. Id.
69. Abbott v. Abbott, 2002 OK CIV APP 6, ¶ 14, 38 P.3d 937, 940-41.
70. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 112(D) (2011).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See discussion supra Section I.C.3.b.
74. 2005 OK 4, ¶ 17, 107 P.3d 570, 578.
75. Id. ¶¶ 30, 32, 107 P.3d at 581.
76. Id. In an unpublished case, an appellate panel held that this attorney fee provision
refers only to denial of visitation in subsection (D) and not to all issues covered under
section 112. Janes v. Janes, No. 113,171 (Okla. Civ. App. Mar. 22, 2016).
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d) Section 109.4
Title 43, section 109.4, which applies to grandparent visitation, provides
that
[i]f the court finds that visitation rights of the grandparent have
been unreasonably denied or otherwise unreasonably interfered
with by the parent, the court shall enter an order providing for
one or more of the following:
....
d. assessment of reasonable attorney fees, mediation costs,
and court costs to enforce visitation rights against the
parent. 77
However, the statute also provides that “[i]f the court finds that the motion
for enforcement of visitation rights has been unreasonably filed or pursued
by the grandparent, the court may assess reasonable attorney fees,
mediation costs, and court costs against the grandparent.”78
These grandparent visitation enforcement provisions are the same as
those enforcement provisions in title 43, section 111.3.79 There are no cases
interpreting the attorney fee provisions of the grandparent visitation
statutes, but it will undoubtedly be interpreted in the same manner as
section 111.3.
4. Miscellaneous Attorney Fee Provisions
A fourth category of prevailing-party statutes is also important for courts
and attorneys to consider. This section of the article details five
miscellaneous attorney fee provisions that fall within this category.
a) Tortious Interference With Custody or Visitation
Third parties who remove or assist another in removing a child with the
intent to deny a parent custody or visitation can be liable for damages under
title 43, section 111.2. 80 The prevailing party in an action under this section
is awarded attorney fees.81 There are no cases applying this statute.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

43 OKLA. STAT. § 109.4(F)(6) (Supp. 2016).
Id. 109.4(F)(7).
43 OKLA. STAT. § 111.3 (Supp. 2014).
43 OKLA. STAT. § 111.2 (2011).
Id.
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b) Victims of Domestic Violence
One of the more interesting attorney fee provisions is title 43, section
112.6. It provides that
[i]n a dissolution of marriage or separate maintenance or custody
proceeding, a victim of domestic violence or stalking shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs after the filing of a
petition, upon application and a showing by a preponderance of
evidence that the party is currently being stalked or has been
stalked or is the victim of domestic abuse. The court shall order
that the attorney fees and costs of the victimized party for the
proceeding be substantially paid for by the abusing party prior to
and after the entry of a final order. 82
There are no cases interpreting this statute. Its mention of dissolution or
separate maintenance 83 indicates that it only applies prior to a divorce
decree. To show an entitlement to attorney fees, a party must prove that she
is a victim of stalking or domestic abuse.84 The statute seems to
contemplate that this determination be made soon after the petition is filed,
perhaps in conjunction with the temporary order.85 The fees must be paid
“prior to and after the entry of a final order.”86
c) Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act
Title 43, section 150.10 provides that
[i]f the court finds that a party to a proceeding under the
Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act has acted in bad
faith or otherwise deliberately failed to comply with the terms of
the Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act or a court
order issued under the Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation
Act, the court may assess attorney fees and costs against the
opposing party and order any other appropriate sanctions. 87
The statute does not mention a “prevailing party.” It does seem, however, to
assume that only the prevailing party can be awarded attorney fees, since it
requires bad faith or deliberate failure to comply with the terms of the act.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. § 112.6.
But not annulment, apparently.
43 OKLA. STAT. § 112.6.
See id.
Id.
Id. § 150.10.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

678

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:663

d) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(“UCCJEA”) has two provisions that provide for attorney fees. First, title
43, section 551-208 allows a court to decline jurisdiction if the person
invoking the court’s jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct.88 If
the court does decline jurisdiction, it must assess attorney fees and other
costs against the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction. 89 This attorney fee
provision—like section 551-312 below—is based on a comparable statute
under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.90 The statute
includes a defense that the imposition of fees would be clearly
inappropriate.91
The second provision of the UCCJEA providing for fees is section 551312, which entitles the prevailing party to enforcement proceedings under
article 3 of the UCCJEA to obtain attorney fees as well as other costs.92 It is
also subject to a “clearly inappropriate” defense.93
e) Protective Orders
The statute dealing with protective orders, title 22, section 60.2, provides
that a court “may assess court costs, service of process fees, attorney fees,
other fees and filing fees against the defendant at the hearing on the
petition, if a protective order is granted.”94 The court does have authority,
however, to waive the costs and fees if the court finds that the party does
not have the ability to pay them. 95 If the “petition for a protective order has
been filed frivolously and no victim exists, the court may assess attorney
fees and court costs against the plaintiff.” 96

88. Id. § 551-208(A).
89. Id. § 551-208(C).
90. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 9000-11 (Supp. III 2015).
91. Id. § 9007(b)(3). There is considerable amount of interpretation of this language as
used in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. A discussion of this provision lies
well beyond the scope of this article.
92. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 551-312.
93. Id.
94. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 60.2(c)(1) (Supp. 2013).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 60.2(C)(2). In Murlin v. Pearman, the court found that a protective order filed
against the defendant—which was filed so that a friend of the plaintiff could gain an
advantage in a custody case—was falsely and frivolously filed. 2016 OK 47, ¶¶ 26-27, 371
P.3d 1094, 1099. Therefore, the court found that awarding attorney fees against the plaintiff
was proper. Id.
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II. Procedure and the Role of the Burk Decision in Evidentiary Hearings
A. General Procedure in Obtaining Attorney Fees
A motion for attorney fees must be filed within thirty days after the filing
of a judgment, decree, or other appealable order.97 An appealable order is a
judgment, decree, or order that is final.98 Therefore, a litigant has thirty
days from the denial of a motion for a new trial to file an application for
attorney fees. 99 The trial court may set a deadline for receipt of the time
sheets, affidavits, and other materials that must be included in the
application for attorney fees. 100 Failure to comply with the trial court’s
deadline may result in a dismissal of the application for fees.101
B. Evidentiary Hearings and the Effect of Burk
Recurring issues in deciding an application for attorney fees include (1)
whether a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing before awarding fees
and (2) the scope of such a hearing.
State ex rel Burk v. City of Oklahoma City seemed to require that all trial
courts, before awarding a fee, hold an evidentiary hearing and apply certain
factors in determining the fee.102 Burk directs a trial court to consider the
following criteria:
1. The time and labor required
2. The novelty and difficulty of the questions
3. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly
4. The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due
to acceptance of the case
5. The customary fee
6. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent
7. Time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances
8. The amount involved and the results obtained

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

12 OKLA. STAT. § 696.4(B) (Supp. 2012); OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.22(c)(2).
Haggard v. Haggard, 1998 OK 124, ¶ 13, 975 P.2d 439, 442.
See id. ¶ 7, 975 P.2d at 441.
See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2006 OK CIV APP 112, ¶ 34-35, 144 P.3d 173, 185-86.
Id. ¶ 35, 144 P.3d at 186.
1979 OK 115, ¶ 4, 598 P.2d 659, 660.
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9. The experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys
10. The “undesirability” of the case
11. The nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client
12. Awards in similar cases 103
The relationship between these factors and the factors set out in the
Finger decision is unclear. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has never held
that the Burk factors are applicable to domestic relations cases.104 One panel
of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals attempted to reconcile the two
cases in Smith v. Smith.105 In this case regarding child support collection,
the obligee was the prevailing party. 106 Neither party requested an
evidentiary hearing and, ultimately, the court issued an order awarding the
obligee over $10,000 in attorney fees.107 The obligor appealed, arguing that
the trial court had an obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing and apply the
Burk factors to determine whether an attorney fee award was appropriate.108
The appellate panel noted that, in the absence of a contract or statute fixing
the amount, the factors courts consider in domestic relations cases for
determining a reasonable attorney fee and possible lodestar incentive fee or
bonus fee are comparable to those factors set out in Burk. 109 The panel then
concluded that an evidentiary hearing is required when issues are raised as
to the amount of time spent and the complexity of the case or trial in
opposition to a domestic relations fee request. 110 Thus, the trial court is not
required to hold a Burk hearing but is required to hold an evidentiary
hearing.
More recently, another panel of the court of civil appeals took a much
closer look at the relationship between Burk and Finger. In two wellreasoned—albeit unpublished—opinions, 111 the panel noted that the only
103. Id. ¶ 8, 598 P.2d at 661 (quoting Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 18788 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
104. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Fagin, 1992 OK 118, ¶ 20, 848 P.2d 11, 15.
105. 2013 OK CIV APP 54, 305 P.3d 1054.
106. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 305 P.3d at 1057.
107. Id. ¶ 3, 305 P.3d at 1055.
108. Id. ¶ 4, 305 P.3d at 1056.
109. Id. ¶ 5, 305 P.3d at 1056.
110. Id. ¶ 9, 305 P.3d at 1057.
111. Kannard v. Kannard (In re Marriage of Kannard), No. 112,760 (Okla. Civ. App.
Feb. 22, 2016), cert. denied, Order, Kannard, No. 112,760 (Okla. June 27, 2016); Hall v.
Hall, No. 112,350 (Okla. Civ. App. Jan. 27, 2016).
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overlap between the two lists of factors is that one of the Finger criteria,
“the results obtained,” is close to the Burk factor “the outcome of the
action.” 112 Otherwise, the Burk factors mostly address the “lodestar” issue
of fee rate and other factors determining the amount of the attorney fees. 113
Finger primarily addresses the factors that should be considered in
balancing the equities to determine if an attorney fee is proper at all, not the
amount of the fee. 114 As the panel noted, although it is difficult to see how
the Burk analysis helps to determine whether a fee is appropriate under
equitable-balancing statutes, the analysis is helpful in deciding how the fee
should be calculated after such a determination is made. 115 The panel then
concluded that the attorney fee analysis undertaken pursuant to title 43,
section 110 should be reviewed primarily by the Finger criteria. 116 As the
panel noted,
[b]ecause of the continuing jurisdiction of the courts in domestic
cases, it is possible for a party to essentially “never give up” and
engage in continued post-decree motions for many years. Section
110 allows a trial court to set and award varying fees based on
the relative equities and means of the parties in such cases,
protect parties from the cost of repeated litigation brought with
little chance of success, and discourage behavior that is wasteful
of the court’s time and the parties’ money. This structure and
purpose is fundamentally different from that of mandatory
prevailing party fees, where the Burk criteria control. It is our
view that Finger primarily controls in these cases, and Burk is
useful only as far as setting the reasonable hourly rate for the
services performed. It is also our view that Burk findings are not
required in these cases.117
It follows from this analysis that the Burk criteria are primarily to be
used under the prevailing-party attorney fee statutes to determine how the
fee is to be calculated. Under those statutes, equitable criteria are not to be
considered. The appellate panel, in its next case, found that “[t]he Burk
process takes no account of the parties’ equities in setting a fee, and
essentially requires all hours properly billed to a fee-bearing matter to be
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Hall, No. 112,350, at *11.
Id. at *11-12.
Kannard, No. 112,760, at *7-8.
Hall, No. 112,350 at *12-14.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *13-14.
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compensated at an established lodestar rate, irrespective of the parties’
relative equities or degree of malfeasance.”118 But the determination of the
amount of the fee that can be recovered under non-prevailing-party statutes
is subject to equitable considerations and the court may award some or all
of the requested fees. 119
This analysis from the court of civil appeals is quite valuable. It
accommodates both cases by applying Finger to the equitable-balancing
cases and Burk primarily to prevailing-party cases. As the panel noted, if
this approach is incorrect, specific supreme court guidance on the proper
procedure would be helpful. 120
III. The Lawyer’s Interest in the Fee
A. Attorney Fees Payable Directly to the Attorney
An attorney fee can be made payable directly to the attorney. 121 If a trial
court orders payment of attorney fees directly to the wife’s attorney so the
wife can prosecute an appeal, it has jurisdiction to order the attorney to
refund part of the amount so paid.122 The court of civil appeals, however,
cannot order sua sponte that the attorney pay fees back to the court without
notice of the issue.123 The issue of attorney fees is not abated when one
party dies following the pronouncement of the divorce. 124 As long as the
divorce matter is still pending at the time the attorney seeks, in his own
right, fees to which he may be entitled, the attorney has a personal interest
in those fees sufficient to give him standing. 125
If the attorney fee award is to be paid directly to the attorney, the parties
cannot circumvent the order by one party paying the amount directly to the

118. Kannard, No. 112,760, at *7 (emphasis omitted).
119. Id. at *8.
120. Id. at *11. With these two cases, it seems clear that this approach is going to be
applied by the Tulsa panels of the court of civil appeals and should be taken into account in
planning for attorney fee hearings.
121. Tilley v. Price, 1954 OK 76, ¶ 11, 267 P.2d 996, 997-98; Owens v. Owens, 1953
OK 310, ¶ 9, 264 P.2d 341, 342. If a temporary order requires payment of fees to an
attorney, the attorney fee award will survive a dismissal of the case. Groenewold v.
Groenewold, 1943 OK 391, ¶ 14, 144 P.2d 965, 966-67; Kelly v. Maupin, 1936 OK 344, ¶
16, 58 P.2d 116, 119.
122. Musser v. Musser, 1998 OK CIV APP 13, ¶ 12, 955 P.2d 744, 747.
123. Ford v. Ford, 1988 OK 103, ¶ 10, 766 P.2d 950, 954.
124. Swick v. Swick, 1993 OK 151, ¶ 9, 864 P.2d 819, 822.
125. Id. ¶ 12, 864 P.2d at 822-23.
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other party. 126 The supreme court ruled in Nichols v. Nichols that an
attorney fee award owed to a divorcing spouse—along with any money
received in payment of that award—attaches, by operation of law, a
constructive trust for the benefit of the attorney who represented the
spouse. 127 The spouse is the trustee of the trust and the lawyer who
represented the spouse is the beneficiary. 128 The continuing nature of the
attorney fee award that comprises the corpus of the trust militates against
the running of the statute of limitations unless there has been a repudiation
of the trust by the trustee.129
The court of civil appeals in Nichols had previously ruled that the statute
of limitations barred the lawyer from enforcing a charging lien against the
funds the wife received. 130 The wife filed for bankruptcy and, four years
later, sued her ex-husband to collect the award. 131 In the bankruptcy, she
listed the law firm as an unsecured creditor.132 Upon review, the supreme
court determined that the court of civil appeals should have analyzed the
case as one involving a constructive trust.133 The wife’s bankruptcy,
therefore, had no effect on the lawyer’s interest in the fee award because the
award remained viable post-discharge and could be enforced. 134 In addition,
the bankruptcy trustee had abandoned any claim the wife might have to the
award and the award was not for her benefit, but for the benefit of the
lawyer. 135
B. How Sandel Distinguished Attorney Fees Payable Directly to Attorneys
The court of civil appeals distinguished cases that allow a fee to be paid
directly to the attorney in Sandel v. Sandel (In re Marriage of Sandel). 136
Following the couple’s divorce, the wife sought attorney fees but filed for
bankruptcy just prior to the determination of the fee issue.137 In her
bankruptcy petition, she listed her divorce law firm as an unsecured

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Nichols v. Nichols, 2009 OK 43, ¶ 11, 222 P.3d 1049, 1054-55.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 14, 222 P.3d at 1055.
Id. ¶ 6, 222 P.3d at 1053.
Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 222 P.3d at 1052.
Id. ¶ 3, 222 P.3d at 1052.
Id. ¶¶ 11-13, 222 P.3d at 1054-55.
Id. ¶ 16, 222 P.3d at 1056.
Id.
2009 OK CIV APP 7, ¶ 12, 217 P.3d 141, 144.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 217 P.3d at 142.
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creditor. 138 She also indicated, however, that the husband was co-debtor. 139
The bankruptcy court granted the law firm relief from the automatic stay in
order to prosecute the fee application, but ultimately discharged the wife of
all her debts, including the debt owed to the firm. 140 The trial court then
denied the law firm’s request for fees, finding that the wife had no standing
to seek them after the discharge. 141
The law firm relied on Swick v. Swick 142 to contend at trial and on appeal
that it had the authority to seek fees on its own behalf, independent of the
wife. The appellate panel found the firm’s reading of Swick far too broad. 143
The panel noted that an attorney representing a deceased party in a divorce
proceeding—the context in Swick—clearly has a claim for attorney fees in
the client’s probate proceeding. 144 Additionally, the claim in Swick fell
under a different part of the statute than the claim in Sandel. 145 In Swick, the
court relied on the current title 43, section 110(E) of the Oklahoma Statutes,
which provides for “additional orders . . . made for the benefit of either
party or their respective attorneys.” 146 Sandel, however, involved section
111(D), which does not contain a provision for “their respective
attorneys.” 147 In the absence of that phrase, the court of civil appeals could
not find “any authority for the proposition that an attorney for one party to a
divorce has a claim for attorney fees independent of the contractual
relationship between the attorney and that party or the court’s authority to
require the other party to the proceeding to pay those fees.”148
The panel then found that the wife’s claim for fees was a part of the
bankruptcy estate. 149
If . . . the claim against Husband for attorney fees belonged to
the Law Firm, the Law Firm would not have needed permission
138. Id. ¶ 3, 217 P.3d at 142.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 4, 217 P.3d at 142.
142. 1993 OK 151, ¶ 12, 864 P.2d 819, 823 (“[I]t is quite clear that as long as the divorce
matter is still pending . . . at the time the attorney seeks in his own right fees to which he
may be entitled, the attorney has a personal interest in those fees sufficient to give him
standing to pursue recovery of them in his own right.”).
143. Sandel, ¶ 10, 215 P.3d at 143.
144. Id. ¶ 13, 217 P.3d at 143-44.
145. Id. ¶ 13, 217 P.3d at 144.
146. Id.; 43 OKLA. STAT. § 110(E) (2011).
147. Sandel, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d at 144; 43 OKLA. STAT. § 110(D).
148. Sandel, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d at 144.
149. Id. ¶ 16, 217 P.3d at 145.
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from the bankruptcy court to pursue that claim. Although any
attempt to enforce the Law Firm’s contractual rights against
Wife for the fees . . . would have been stayed by Wife’s
bankruptcy filing, the Law Firm’s application did not seek to
recover against Wife. Rather, the Law Firm’s application asked
the district court to require Husband to pay Wife’s reasonable
expenses incurred in the divorce proceeding pursuant to 43 O.S.
Supp. § 110(D). . . . Consequently, no bankruptcy proceeding
filed by Husband prevented the prosecution of the application
against him. Nonetheless, the Law Firm sought relief from the
bankruptcy court in Wife’s proceeding, as it was required to do,
because the claim for attorney fees asserted in the application
was an asset of Wife’s bankruptcy estate.
By granting the Law Firm’s motion and lifting the automatic
stay, the bankruptcy court allowed the Law Firm to pursue
Wife’s claim on behalf of the bankrupt’s estate. That relief,
however, did not constitute an abandonment of Wife’s claim for
attorney fees. . . . The Law Firm was specifically authorized by
the bankruptcy court to pursue that claim on behalf of the estate.
Any recovery will be property of the estate. Whether the Law
Firm may recover those fees, if awarded, is a matter for the
bankruptcy court. 150
IV. Ethical Considerations
Attorneys who practice family law are uniquely subject to ethical
considerations affecting how fees are charged; such considerations do not
bind attorneys who practice in other areas. 151 Oklahoma attorneys, like
150. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 217 P.3d at 145 (citations omitted).
151. Another area that affects family law, as well as some other areas of practice, is the
problem of the non-refundable retainer. A family law attorney may not provide for a
non-refundable retainer in an hourly rate contract, even if the written fee agreement clearly
and specifically states that the original retainer amount is non-refundable. Wright v. Arnold,
1994 OK CIV APP 26, ¶ 10, 877 P.2d 616, 618. This issue was addressed by the court of
civil appeals in Wright v. Arnold. Id. In finding a non-refundable retainer clause
unenforceable in an hourly rate fee contract, the court said:
[A non-refundable retainer provision] is an impermissible restraint on the right
of a client to freely discharge her attorney. This provision also contravenes the
Code of Professional Conduct, which requires an attorney, upon the termination
of the attorney-client relationship, to protect his client’s interest by refunding
any advanced payment which has not been earned. We hold that the attorney
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those in other states, may not charge a fee that is contingent upon, or
enhanced because of, the result in a divorce case.152
A. Prohibition on Contingency Fees in Domestic Relations Matters
The governing rule is Rule 1.5 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional
Conduct, which provides that a lawyer may not charge “any fee in a
domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent
upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or
property settlement in lieu thereof.”153
under such circumstances is entitled to only such fees as the attorney can show
are reasonable for the services actually performed.
Id. ¶ 10, 877 P.2d at 618-19. The court noted that other jurisdictions that had considered the
issue reasoned that non-refundable retainer clauses have a “chilling effect” on a client’s right
to freely discharge his or her attorney. Id. ¶ 12, 877 P.2d at 619 (quoting Estate of Forrester
v. Dawalt, 562 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)). Hence, the court found the
provisions to be unethical and unenforceable. Id. ¶ 15, 877 P.2d at 619.
152. 5 OKLA. STAT. app. 3-A, r. 1.5 (2011).
153. Id. The full version of Rule 1.5 provides that:
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and
expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the
client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly
represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of
the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited
by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing
signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be
determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses
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This rule is long-standing and well-known to all family law attorneys. 154
In Oklahoma, it was first announced in Opperud v. Bussey. 155 In that case,
an attorney and his client had an agreement that the attorney “should
receive 12½ per cent. of whatever amount was awarded her by the
judgment of [the] court [in the divorce] together with whatever fees might
be allowed by the court.” 156 In a suit to collect the fee, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court found the contract violated public policy. 157 In language
used by almost every court since, the supreme court said:
A contract between an attorney and client, providing for the
payment of a fee to the attorney contingent upon the
procurement of a divorce for the client, is against public policy
and illegal and void. Such a situation involves the personal
interest of the attorney in preventing a reconciliation between the
parties, a thing which the law favors and public policy
encourages. 158

to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must
clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable
whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written
statement stating the outcome of the matter, and, if there is a recovery, showing
the remittance to the client and the method of determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of
which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of
alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may
be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer
or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client agrees to the arrangement and the agreement is confirmed
in writing; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Id.
154. The rule has been around at least since the end of the 19th century. See Jordan v.
Westerman, 28 N.W. 826 (Mich. 1886).
155. 1935 OK 221, 46 P.2d 319.
156. Id. ¶ 2, 46 P.2d at 320.
157. Id. ¶ 33, 46 P.2d at 325.
158. Id. ¶ 21, 46 P.2d at 322; see also Newman v. Freitas, 61 P. 907 (Cal. 1900).
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This language was echoed by the Oklahoma Bar Association in Legal
Ethics Opinion No. 299, 159 finding that (1) the law favors marriage and
discourages divorce and a contingent fee contract gives the attorney an
interest in securing the divorce, thus preventing reconciliation, and (2) a
suit for divorce is not a cause of action “ex contractu” or “ex delicto” within
the meaning of title 5, section 7 of the Oklahoma Statutes, as the property
rights are “merely incidental to the dissolution of the status.” 160
Given this rationale, one would suspect that, if the granting of the
divorce was not at issue in the case, 161 the rule would be inapplicable. After
all, the supreme court in Smith v. Armstrong & Murphy limited the
expansion of the Opperud rule. 162 Smith was a fee collection case where the
[p]laintiff employed defendants, as attorneys, to represent her in
an action against her husband wherein she sought a divorce and
also sought recovery of certain monies previously advanced to
her husband and certain stock in a corporation acquired as a
result of a joint venture of plaintiff and her husband in an oil
enterprise. The contract provided for payment of a fixed sum for
representing plaintiff in the divorce action and further provided
that in the event of a recovery of money or property, defendants
should receive a percentage thereof.”163
Upholding the contract, the court said that “[t]he rule announced in
Opperud v. Bussey . . . being in derogation of rights granted by [title 5,
section 7 of the Oklahoma Statutes] should not be extended further than the
necessities of the case require.” 164

159. Legal Ethics Opinion No. 299, 52 OKLA. BAR J. 2101, 2101-02 (1981).
160. Id.; see also Longmire v. Hall, 1975 OK CIV APP 36, ¶ 12, 541 P.2d 276, 278
(holding that contingent-fee contracts encourage divorce and, since the court can award a
dependent spouse attorney fees, there is no need for contingent fees). The Oklahoma Bar
Association’s view that a divorce action is not covered under title 5, section 7 of the
Oklahoma Statutes contradicts the reasoning of the Smith case and probably should not be
relied upon. See infra text accompanying notes 162-164.
161. Given the universal adoption of no-fault divorce, the granting of the divorce itself is
rarely, if ever, a contested issue in a divorce case. New York was one of the last states to
adopt no-fault divorce. Patterson Signs No-Fault Divorce Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/nyregion/16divorce.html.
162. 1937 OK 472, ¶ 8, 73 P.2d 140, 142.
163. Id. ¶ 0, 73 P.2d at 141.
164. Id. ¶ 8, 73 P.2d at 142. It is fascinating that the Smith case has never been cited by
any other Oklahoma case concerned with attorney fees.
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Unfortunately, the language of Rule 1.5 goes well beyond this rationale
and prohibits, in a domestic-relations case, a fee contract that is “contingent
upon the . . . amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu
thereof.” 165 If a client files a post-decree motion to increase or decrease
alimony or child support, there is no divorce at issue in the case. Nothing
the attorney does can prevent the granting of the divorce; it has already
happened. Nonetheless, a fee arrangement providing for a percentage of the
amount recovered is still deemed unethical. 166
The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed in McCrary v. McCrary.167 In that
divorce case, the trial court awarded the house to the wife. 168 The wife
engaged an attorney to handle the appeal.169 If the attorney won the appeal,
165. 5 OKLA. STAT. app. 3-A, r. 1.5(d)(1) (2011). Interestingly, the prior version of Rule
1.5 prohibited any fee contract in a domestic-relations matter that was dependent upon the
result obtained, regardless of the issue. 5 OKLA. STAT. app. 3-A, r. 1.5 (d)(1) (amended
2008). Now it only prohibits fee arrangements that depend upon the amount of money
recovered. See 5 OKLA. STAT. app. 3-A, r. 1.5 (d)(1) (2011). Technically, therefore, an
attorney could enter into a fee arrangement which would provide for an enhanced recovery
contingent upon the results obtained on custody and visitation issues. We know, however, of
no attorney who has attempted to do so.
One wonders who drafted the Oklahoma version of the Model Rules. Oklahoma law
provides for alimony in lieu of property division (property-division alimony), a form of
judgment authorized by title 43, section 121, to achieve a fair and just division of property.
43 OKLA. STAT. § 121 (2011). Property in lieu of alimony, however, is something unknown
to Oklahoma law. No doubt the drafters meant property-division alimony, but they clearly
did not say that.
166. Fee agreements to collect back-due child support and other monies due under a
divorce decree can be funded based on a percentage of the amount collected. Benson v.
State, 1962 OK 182, ¶ 11, 375 P.2d 958, 960; State v. Cosby, 1955 OK 173, ¶ 8, 285 P.2d
210, 213. Since collection and modification are often both at issue in a post-decree motion,
the fee contract must clearly segregate the fee for modification (which must be charged on
an hourly basis) from the collection fee (which can be a percentage of the amount collected).
The attorneys in the Smith case did so and the court found the practice acceptable there.
Smith, ¶ 8, 73 P.2d at 142.
Other states have also approved of such divided contracts. See, e.g., Ballesteros v. Jones,
985 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1998). In that case involving an action to establish a
common-law marriage and divorce, a Texas court held that payment of $90,000 under a
contingent-fee contract for one-third of the settlement recovery was acceptable. Id. at 497.
While contingent fees are “rarely justified in divorce actions,” the court said, if a commonlaw marriage was not established in this case, the client would recover nothing. Id. This case
was quite different, then, from a divorce suit involving a ceremonial marriage in which each
party would obtain a recovery of some sort.
167. 1988 OK 122, 764 P.2d 522.
168. Id. ¶ 3, 764 P.2d at 523.
169. Id. ¶ 4, 764 P.2d at 524.
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he would be entitled to keep the house.170 Even though the divorce was not
part of the appeal (and was therefore final), 171 the court found that the house
was a contingency fee in a domestic-relations action and the arrangement
was therefore illegal. 172
The court extended the prohibition of contingency fee contracts in
domestic-relations cases to encompass a results-obtained fee contract—a
fee contract under which an attorney charges an additional amount if he
obtains an exceptional result.173 In Oklahoma Bar Association v. Fagin, the
court disciplined an attorney based on such a provision in his fee
contract. 174 The attorney billed the client for the amount due based on his
hourly rate, plus an additional $4,000 in fees for an
[a]dditional attorney fee based upon “results obtained” for client
as prescribed in written attorney fee contract, because of
extremely beneficial court decision for client on alimony in lieu
of property, and support alimony together totaling $114,000 plus
interest on the $60,000 alimony in lieu of property award, and
with former husband also being required to pay all of the
extensive marital debts.175
The written fee agreement clearly provided for such an enhanced fee. 176
Nonetheless, the court found the portion of the fee based on the results
obtained for the client to be a violation of Rule 1.5(d).177 The court said that
such a fee arrangement, in which the attorney will receive an enhanced fee

170. Id.
171. Id. ¶ 1, 764 P.2d at 523. See title 43, section 127, which provides:
Every decree of divorce shall recite the day and date when the judgment was
rendered. If an appeal be taken from a judgment granting or denying a divorce,
that part of the judgment does not become final and take effect until the appeal
is determined. If an appeal be taken from any part of a judgment in a divorce
action except the granting of the divorce, the divorce shall be final and take
effect from the date the decree of divorce is rendered, provided neither party
thereto may marry another person until six (6) months after the date the decree
of divorce is rendered; that part of the judgment appealed shall not become
final and take effect until the appeal be determined.
43 OKLA. STAT. § 127 (2011).
172. McCrary, ¶ 15, 764 P.2d at 525.
173. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Fagin, 1992 OK 118, ¶ 30, 848 P.2d 11, 16.
174. Id.
175. Id. ¶ 3, 848 P.2d at 12.
176. Id.
177. Id. ¶ 30, 848 P.2d at 16.
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based on results obtained, is prohibited.178 The court also held that such a
contract “involves a personal interest because the greater amount he obtains
for his client, the greater he can charge as a fee,” and that such clauses give
the attorney “a personal interest in assuring a divorce is granted, because
without a divorce he will not be able to charge a fee based upon the
alimony and property settlement.” 179
B. Should This Prohibition Cease to Exist?
Although fees that are contingent on a result in a domestic-relations case
have been prohibited for almost 150 years,180 it is difficult to see the
rationale for the continuation of such a rule. The oft-cited reason to retain
the rule is that contingent fees promote divorce and give the attorney an
interest in preventing reconciliation. 181 But this rationale is untenable. First,
such reasoning comes dangerously close to placing on the attorney an
affirmative duty to attempt to reconcile his client with his or her estranged
spouse—a task to which the attorney is not professionally suited. Second,
an attorney’s covert manipulations are unlikely to be very effective against
a marriage that cannot be saved. The insinuation that most attorneys would
discourage reconciliation of spouses contemplating divorce is also tenuous.
One can just as easily argue that a contingent fee promotes reconciliation
because clients would be tempted to reconcile to avoid paying the fee.182
178. Id. Results obtained is a factor that can be considered in other attorney fee contracts
in Rule 1.5(a). 5 OKLA. STAT. app. 3-A, r. 1.5 (a)(4) (2011).
179. Fagin, ¶ 16, 848 P.2d at 14. Rule 1.5 at the time of the Fagin case prohibited any
fee in a domestic-relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the
result obtained. 5 OKLA. STAT. app. 3-A, Rule 1.5 (amended 1998). The current Rule 1.5 no
longer uses the same language; it simply provides for a prohibition of a fee that is
“contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or
property settlement in lieu thereof.” 5 OKLA. STAT. app. 3-A, r. 1.5 (2011). One could argue
that the current rule no longer prohibits a results-obtained fee but only prohibits fees that are
contingent upon securing an amount of a monetary award. No one, however, appears to have
made that argument.
A more appropriate basis for deciding the Fagin case could be that a fee contract that
gives the attorney a right to negotiate a “bonus” is untenable because such a clause must be
in plain language and explain how it will be triggered. Nothing in the contract at issue in the
Fagin case indicated how it would be determined that the attorney had obtained such a result
that an additional fee would be charged. Fagin, ¶ 12, 848 P.2d at 13. Nor did the agreement
specify what the additional fee would be. Id.
180. See Jordan v. Westerman, 28 N.W. 826 (Mich. 1886).
181. Id. at 830.
182. In Polis v. Briggs, such reconciliation apparently happened. 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 792,
794 (Phila. Cty. 1975).
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It would also seem that, under this rationale, any fee arrangement
between an attorney and a client in a divorce case, including charging by
the hour, could be thought to discourage reconciliation and give the
attorney an interest in procuring a divorce. Even an agreement based on
hourly fees can be thought of as discouraging reconciliation because every
divorce case prosecuted to termination produces a higher fee than if the
case had ended in reconciliation.
Setting aside Oklahoma’s reconciliation-based rationale, other rationales
not cited by Oklahoma courts also do not hold up. First, some argue that
contingent fee arrangements tend to deprive a dependent spouse of an
award intended for his or her living expenses, and that contingent fees tend
to frustrate and defeat a court’s efforts to make an equitable provision for
the spouse since the fee is deducted from the amount awarded.183 But
contingent fee arrangements do not interfere with court-ordered schedules
of alimony and support. 184 Chances are very good that the attorney fee
would be paid from the alimony or child support once received by the
client. The only difference appears to be whether the fee comes out before
or after the client receives it.
If support issues are not a part of the case and this is to be the rationale, it
should follow that the prohibition on contingent fees should not be
applicable. That is the case in some states. The Tennessee Supreme Court
approved a fee agreement that authorized the attorney to charge up to
fifteen percent of the amount of property awarded to the client. 185 The fee
was not contingent, the court said, because the attorney would be paid
regardless of whether the client won the case.186
Second, clients in divorce cases are not more vulnerable than other
clients. Some courts express concern that, because of the client's personal
situation, he or she is particularly vulnerable to attorney overreach.187 These
courts often conclude that the mere presence of a contingent fee contract

183. Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn. 1956).
184. See Marquis v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 146 P.3d 1130, 1138 (Nev. 2006)
(suggesting that contingency fees interfere with support schedules).
185. Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689, 698 (Tenn. 1998) (approving a fee of
$500,000).
186. Id. at 693.
187. See Barelli v. Levin, 247 N.E.2d 847, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969) (arguing that wives
contemplating divorce are often distraught and without experience in negotiating contracts
and distinguishing Kreiger v. Bulpitt, 251 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1953), which held that a contingent
fee contract with a husband is valid when the contract concerned defending against a divorce
instead of instituting an action).
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evidences overreach. 188 It is difficult to imagine that family law clients are
any more vulnerable that personal injury, wrongful death, or probate
clients. Indeed, such a rationale is tantamount to saying members of the
domestic-relations bar as a group are more disreputable and more
susceptible to temptation than their fellow lawyers. This conclusion has no
basis other than the long-standing, erroneous tendency to assume that
“good” lawyers do not handle domestic-relations cases.
At some point, the question of how family law attorneys should charge
clients needs full discussion. Considerations include questions of whether
an attorney can charge a lump sum for a divorce, how that lump sum should
be calculated, and whether an attorney should charge on a per-function
basis. Unfortunately, the prohibition on contingent fees has inhibited such
discussion.
V. Conclusion
Attorney fee awards may be the least understood of all monetary awards
that arise in the context of divorce cases. Perhaps this is because most
litigants do not concentrate on the issue until the case is over. Given the
plethora of attorney fee statutes, attorneys and clients should focus on the
attorney fee issue much earlier in the proceeding, not only to assess whether
fees can be awarded, but also to determine how they are to be calculated.

188. Id.
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